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The Beijing Plus Five PrepCom at UN Headquarters, New York, 3-17 March 2000: An Informal Report The Beijing Plus Five PrepCom met in New York at the UN Headquarters from March 3 to17, following the 44th Session of the UN Commission
on the Status of Women, February 28- March 2, 2000. This PrepCom was designed to be the final one before the UN
General Assembly Special Session on Beijing, Women 2000, June 5-9, 2000, but because its work was far from completed,
“intersessional informal meetings” are now scheduled to be held on April 20 and May 8, 9, 11, and May 30 to June 2, 2000,
also at UN Headquarters.
The PrepCom agenda called for consideration of the following documents: A political declaration that all states will sign; a
non-negotiable appraisal document prepared by the UN Secretariat Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) that
notes trends identified by the governments that signed the Beijing Platform for Action (PFA) and answered a
questionnaire from the UN Secretary General; and-most important of all--an “outcome document,” also prepared by DAW,
officially titled “Further actions and initiatives to implement the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action.” The work of the PrepCom was divided between two Working Groups, assisted by several sub-groups (“contact groups”).
It is impossible for me to write a comprehensive report on what happened at every stage of
this very complicated and, most would say, discouraging meeting. I was at the UN for only 5
of the 11 days of the session. Moreover, the Working Groups were unable to complete their
assigned tasks.
Although agreement on the Political Declaration was reached, at least three
quarters of the “outcome document” (one of the delegates told me it was more accurately 95%)
was still in brackets or subject to further discussion when the meeting adjourned. And finally, the disagreements in the official session were more than matched
by the disruptive activities led by “anti-PFA” NGOs that, for several days, appeared to be
taking over the corridors as well as some of the NGO workshops and caucuses (particularly the
Youth Caucus) and, in a few instances, tried to interrupt the official sessions.
Altogether, more than 1000 NGO representatives were given accreditation to attend the
meeting. At least half and more likely two-thirds of them represented NGOs that have a history
of participation in UN activities; the other half (or one-third) represented religious and
self-described “pro-family” groups who are novices in the UN arena and were there to
lobby in opposition to the consensus decisions on reproductive health and related subjects
that appear in the Beijing and Cairo documents that are no longer negotiable. Not all of the
accredited NGOs were present during the entire two weeks of the PrepCom; the corridors and all
UN facilities were particularly crowded during the middle of the first and second weeks, and
then the numbers began to drop off.
At the same time it is important to point out that it would be a mistake to jump to the conclusion that it was the presence of
“opposition” NGOs in large numbers that caused the PrepCom to move at such a slow pace, and in some cases, not to move
at all in regard to large sections of the document text. As is pointed out by the “Earth Negotiations Bulletin,” perhaps “it is
impossible to conduct a review in a highly politicized arena where different groups cannot agree even on basic measurements
of progress…[and] Beijing + 5 is considered an ambitious process since it is going beyond the Cairo and Rio reviews and
attempting not only to forge consensus on future actions, but also to bring governments to negotiated agreements on their
achievements and failures.”
It is important to recognize also that procedure as well as politics has much to do with the lack of progress. At its large
conferences, UN members tend to conduct business through international political blocs, some of which are more formal than
others; sometimes countries operate in more than one group. The more formal of those blocs include the G77 + (developing
countries), EU (European Union and the USA), JUSCANZ (Japan, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and
Switzerland), APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), the Holy See, and OAU (Organization of African Unity).
In order to present a bloc position in regard to an issue or a change in language, discussions must be interrupted to reach consensus
within bloc ranks. This procedure takes a great deal of time. Also, whenever large meetings are held in cities as expensive as
New York, many countries ask their diplomats who are posted nearby to attend rather than send their issue specialists,
thereby complicating the negotiation process with a diverse mix of delegates with differing interests and expertise. Finally, some
experts point out that if the NGOs involved in UN processes are to be effective, they must move from being issue advocates
to becoming high-level political strategists.
Throughout the session, NGOs of every persuasion held numerous workshops, and at least 20 caucuses (regional and
issue-oriented) met daily. A Coalition in Support of the Beijing Platform for Action was formed to express solidarity in the
face of the opposition groups that mobilized during the PrepCom . The Coalition submitted its own 37-page document
suggesting amendments to the “outcome document.” At the end of the session, 230 organizations from more than 50 countries
had signed on to that document.
Following is information for those planning to attend the General Assembly Special Session on Women 2000, June 5-9, 2000
at the UN in New York. |